

Venue: Casa de la Convalescencia (Hospital de Sant Pau) C. de Sant Antoni Maria Claret 171, Barcelona

Day I: Friday, 20th May

08:30 - 09:00 Welcome Coffee and Registration

09:00 - 10:30 Parallel Session 1

Kenan Huremovic IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca

Polarization in Networks: Identification-alienation Framework Luca Paolo Merlino University of Antwerp

Polarization in Endogenous Networks

Yann Bramoullé Aix-Marseille School of Economics

Who Gives, Who Cares?

Coffee Break (room 11) 10:30 - 11:00

11:00 - 12:00 **Parallel Session 2** 

Pierre de Callataÿ CEREC, UCLouvain Saint-Louis Brussels

Minimally Farsighted Unstable Networks

Vincent Vannetelbosch CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain

Segregation versus Assimilation in Friendship Networks with Farsighted and Myopic

12:10 - 13:00 Matt Elliott (Univ. of Cambridge) **Keynote Lecture:** Chair: Pau Milán

Capability Accumulation and Conglomeratization in the Information Age

13:00 - 14:00 Lunch (dining hall)

14:00 - 15:30 Parallel Session 3

Matteo Bizzarri Università di Napoli Federico II

Supply and Demand Function Equilibrium: Trade in a Network of Superstar Firms

Gabriela Stockler Autonomous University of Barcelona

Asset Issuance Price and Networks of Secondary Markets

Yousefimanesh Niloufar Maastricht University

Price-Quantity Competition with Spatial Product Differentiation

15:30 - 16:00 Coffee Break (room 11)

16:00 - 17:00 Parallel Session 4

tian Bervoets; Room: 13 Corvinus University of Budapest

Anastas Tenev "Friends Are Thieves of Time": Heuristic Attention Sharing in Stable Friendship Networks

Aix-Marseille School of Economics Sebastian Bervoets

Public Good Games on Networks with Kantian Agents

17:10 - 18:00 Keynote Lecture: Utku Ünver (Boston College) Chair: Flip Kliin

Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences

18:00 - 19:30 **CTN Board Meeting** 

20:30 - 23:00 C. de l'Escar, 2, Barcelona Dinner at Restaurante Barceloneta

Mehmet Ismail King's College London

The Strategy of Conflict and Cooperation

Alex Possajennikov University of Nottingham

Greedy Demand Adjustment in Cooperative Games

Leanne Streekstra Budapest University of Technology & Economics

Climate Coalition Formation in Continuous Time

Pietro Salmaso University of Malaga

Dynamic Stability in One-Sided Matching

David Pérez-Castrillo Autonomous University of Barcelona & BSE

Constrained-Optimal Tradewise-Stable Outcomes in the One-Sided Assignment Game: A

solution Concept Weaker than the Core

Ata Atav University of Barcelona Complementarities in the Daycare Allocation Problem under Priorities

**Christian Basteck** WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Strategy-Proof and Envy-Free Random Assignment

Péter Biró KRTK. Budapest

Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and

Kidney Exchange

Zsolt Udvari **Economist at Positive Competition** When Transaction Costs Restore Efficiency: Coalition Formation with Costly Binding

Jesús Sánchez-Ibrahim

The Influence of Parties' Influence

Universität Hamburg

09:00 - 10:30 **Parallel Session 5** 

Matching 3

Mustafa Afacan

Sabanci University

The Arbiter Assignment Problem

Sylvain Funck CORE, Louvain

Matching with Farsighted Couples

Université Catholique de Louvain Saint-Louis

Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players?

Coffee Break (room 11) 10:30 - 11:00

11:00 - 12:00 Parallel Session 6

Chair: Fernando Payró; Room: 13

Frédéric Deroïan Aix-Marseille School of Economics

Strategic Communication in Sharing Networks Shaden Shabayek Sciences Po

Hidden Opinions

12:10 - 13:00

**Keynote Lecture:** Maria Montero (Univ. of Nottingham) Chair: Jordi Massó

Bargaining in Weighted Majority Games: Some Counterintuitive Results

Lunch (dining hall) 13:00 - 14:00

14:00 - 16:00 Parallel Session 7

Peter Bayer Toulouse School of Economics

Optimism Leads to Optimality: Ambiguity in Network Formation

Manuel Foerster Bielefeld University Strategic Use of Social Media Influencer Marketing

Nicole Tabasso Ca' Foscari University of Venice Optimal Inspection of Rumors in Networks

Michel Grabisch Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

On the Design of Public Debates in Social Networks

16:00 - 16:30 Farewell Coffee (room 11)

Héctor Hermida Rivera University of East Anglia

The General Implementation Problem

Foivos Savva University of Southampton

The Difference between the Weak Core and the Strong Core from the Design Point of View

Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) & BSE

Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Games with Friend-Oriented Preferences

rman Demeze-Jouatsa; Room: 15

Pedro Calleja University of Barcelona On Manipulability in Financial Systems

Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa IMW, Bielefeld University

Farsighted Rationality in Hedonic Games

Josue Ortega Centre for European Economic Research

A More Efficient and Egalitarian Mechanism for School Choice

Antonio Romero-Medina Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation

Alexander Westkamp University of Cologne

Optimal Sequential Implementation

Antonio Miralles University of Messina & BSE

Catchment Areas and Access to Better Schools





